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BANKRUPTCY-SECURITY INTERESTS IN PRINCIPAL
RESIDENCES: CHAPTER 13 BIFURCATION OF
UNDERSECURED CLAIMS-A POTENTIAL
CRACKDOWN ON CRAMDOWNS
Nobleman v. American Savings Bank (In re Nobleman), 968
F.2d 483 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. Dec. 7,
1992) (No. 92-641)
I. INTRODUCTION
Six years after executing a $68,250 note payable to American
Savings Bank (American) for the purchase of a condominium in
Texas, Leonard and Harriet Nobleman (the Noblemans) filed for
protection under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.' American
timely filed its proof of claim2 for $71,265.04, later amending it to
$71,335.04. 3 The note was secured by a deed of trust on the
Noblemans' condominium residence,4 which was subsequently
valued at $23,500 under their plan of reorganization. 5 The Noble-
1. Nobleman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483, 484-85 (5th Cir.),
cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3337, (U.S. Dec. 7, 1992) (No. 92-641). The Noblemans signed the
note to American on June 21, 1984. In re Nobleman, 129 B.R. 98,99 (N.D. Tex. 1991). The
Noblemans' petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code was filed on
August 6, 1990. Id.
2. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 485. Section 501 of the Bankruptcy Code directs interested
parties such as creditors or equity holders to file a proof of claim or interest. 11 U.S.C. § 501
(1988). A proof of claim is a written statement setting forth a creditor's claim or interest.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(a). Provisions governing the allowance of claims are contained in§ 502 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1988).
3. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 485. American's proof of claim was filed on August 14, 1990.
Nobleman, 129 B.R. at 99.
4. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 484. The deed of trust provided for "a security interest in an
undivided .67% interest in the common areas of the condominium complex, escrow funds,
proceeds of hazard insurance, and rents .... " Id. at 484 n.3. The Noblemans argued that
since the security interest taken by American was in the principal residence and the
aforementioned items, bifurcation of the mortgage lien claim was permissible under
§ 1322(bX2) because the claim was not secured by their principal residence alone.
Nobleman, 129 B.R. at 104. The bankruptcy court found this argument to be "without
merit." Id.
5. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 485. The Noblemans' Chapter 13 plan of reorganization,
although later modified, was filed on August 31, 1990. Nobleman, 129 B.R. at 99. The
Noblemans filed a motion for valuation pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at
485. Section 506(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the
proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any
hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988). An action to value a claim secured by a lien may be commenced
by motion. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012. The court may determine the value of the claim "after
a hearing on notice to the holder of the secured claim . I. " d. Mr. Nobleman testified at
the confirmation hearing regarding the value of the property, with no evidence to the con-
trary being offered. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 485. The facts of the case are undisputed
between the parties. Telephone Interview with Michael J. Schroeder, of Miller, Davis &
Opper, Counsel for Appellee, American Savings Bank (Jan. 29, 1993). The Findings of Fact
have been reproduced throughout the appeal process without dispute from either the
Appellant or Appellee. Id.
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mans then sought court approval under the reorganization plan to
separate American's mortgage lien claim into secured and
unsecured claims pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).6 Such bifurcation
of American's claim would result in the $23,500 scheduled value of
the residence treated as secured, with the remaining balance of
the lien treated as an unsecured claim.7 American and the bank-
ruptcy trustee objected to confirmation of the plan.8 They argued
that the use of § 506(a) to bifurcate American's claim was a modifi-
cation of the lienholder's rights in violation of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1322(bX2), and therefore impermissible.9
The bankruptcy court found that a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
petitioner could not utilize the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 506 to
bifurcate a mortgage lien claim on a principal residence into
secured and unsecured claims without violating the provisions of
11 U.S.C. § 1322(bX2). 10 The court therefore denied confirmation
of the Noblemans' Plan of Reorganization." The district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, stating that to hold
otherwise would diminish the protection against claim modifica-
tion § 1322(bX2) was intended to give home mortgage lenders.' 2
This finding, the court reasoned, provided continuity with the pre-
Code practice of not allowing modification of claims secured by
real estate, at least insofar as claims secured by a mortgage on the
debtor's residence were concerned.13
On further appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
6. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 485. Section 506(a) provides, in pertinent part:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate
has an interest.., is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's
interest ... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such
creditor's interest ... is less than the amount of such allowed claim.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
7. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 485. The plan proposed that payments at the mortgage
contract rate be made to American for only the scheduled $23,500 value of the residence,
with the remainder of the claim to be treated as a general unsecured claim. Id. Unsecured
creditors would receive nothing under the plan, although prepetition arrearages owed to
American would be cured. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. Under § 1322(bX2), a Chapter 13 Plan of Reorganization may "modify the rights
of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor's principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave
unaffected the rights of holders of any class of claims." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(bX2) (1988)
(emphasis added).
10. Nobleman, 129 B.R. at 99.
11. Id. at 104.
12. Id. at 103-04.
13. Id. (citing In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 B.R. 200, 203 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989)). Chief
Judge Sanders, author of the United States District Court opinion, concluded that, "[i]f
Congress had intended to change the manner in which a claim secured by a debtor's
residence would be treated under the Code it would have specifically limited § 1322(bX2) to
claims secured pursuant to § 506. Id. at 103 (quoting In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 B.R. 200,
203 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989)).
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the decisions of the bankruptcy court and district court, and held
that the attempt by the Noblemans to reduce American's secured
claim to the value of the collateral securing the claim and then to
discharge the balance as an unsecured claim was prohibited by
§ 1322(bX2). 14 The court based its findings on what it perceived to
be a specific congressional intent to protect the rights of residen-
tial mortgage lenders from modification. 15 On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court is asked to decide whether "debtors in a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy case [may] use 11 U.S.C. Section 506(a) to
reduce the secured claim upon their residence to fair market
value and treat the balance as an unsecured claim without viola-
tion of 11 U.S.C. Section 1322(bX2)?"'
II. BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power
"[t]o establish . . .uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States."' 17  The Bankruptcy Act of 1898
was the first comprehensive bankruptcy legislation in the United
States.' The Bankruptcy Act and subsequent amendments
remained the primary source of bankruptcy law until its replace-
ment in 1978 by the Bankruptcy Reform Act.19 More commonly
known as the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Reform Act and
its subsequent amendments govern cases filed on or after October
1, 1979.20
To better enable consumer debtors to rehabilitate debt obliga-
tions, rather than having to liquidate their property as required by
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress designed Chapter 13
to afford debtors greater relief than was available under Chapter
XIII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.21 The relief sought by Con-
14. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 489.
15. Id.
16. Brief for Petitioners at i, Nobleman v. American Say. Bank, - S. Ct. - (1993) (No.
92-641).
17. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, el. 4.
18. Rhett Frimet, The Birth of Bankruptcy in the United States, 96 COM. L.J. 160, 188
(1991) (discussing the Bankruptcy Act of July, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed
1978)).
19. Id. (discussing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2549 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1330 (1988)).
20. See Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL
L. REV. 941-42 (1979) (discussing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
92 Stat. 2549 (1978)). For a more complete discussion of the history of the Bankruptcy
Codes, see Klee supra, at 941.
21. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1300.01-.02 (15th ed. 1992). Under Chapter XIII of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, a plan could not deal with a claim secured by an interest in real
estate, although a court could enjoin the foreclosure of a mortgage. REPORT OF THE COMM.
ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st
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gress in enacting Chapter 13 was greater flexibility and easier
accessibility to a wider class of debtors than Chapter XIII of the
Bankruptcy Act had provided.22 Under Chapter 13 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, individuals earning a regular and stable income can
retain their property and adjust their debts through an extension
or composition plan under the protection of the bankruptcy
court.2 3 The court's confirmation of such a plan does not require
the approval of unsecured creditors.24 For holders of secured
claims, however, plans must either be accepted by the secured
creditors, provide for continuance of the lien and the value of any
payments to equal not less than the allowed amount of such claim,
or require the surrender of the secured property to the
creditors. 5
As secured creditors, residential mortgage lenders have
enjoyed the additional protection afforded by § 1322(bX2) of the
Bankruptcy Code.2 6 Section 1322(bX2) prohibits the modification
Sess., pt. 1, at 1 (1973), reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, App. 2 at 165 (15th ed.
1992).
22. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1300.01 (15th ed. 1992); see H.R. REP. No. 595,95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 118, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,6079. Chapter 13 "satisfies many
debtors' desire to avoid the stigma attached to straight bankruptcy and to retain the pride
attendant on being able to meet one's obligations." Id.
23. See generally 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1300.02 (15th ed. 1992). With the
exception of stockbrokers and commodity brokers, Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code is
available only to an "individual with regular income" who has unsecured debts less than
$100,000 and secured debts less than $350,000. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988). Under the
definition set forth in § 101(30), an "individual with regular income" is one "whose income
is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make payments under a plan
under chapter 13." 11 U.S.C. § 101(30) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The benefit to the debtor
of developing a plan of repayment under Chapter 13, rather than opting for liquidation
under Chapter 7, is that it permits the debtor to protect his or her assets. Chapter 13 allows
debtors to remain in possession of their property, unless a confirmed plan or order
confirming a plan provides otherwise. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (1988). Theoretically, the benefit
to creditors is that their losses will be significantly less than if the debtors choose straight
bankruptcy. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6079.
24. The value of payments to unsecured creditors must be at least equal to what the
creditor would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(aX4). See generally
United States v. Estus (In. re Estus), 695 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1982). "Congress liberalized the
provisions of former Chapter 13 by expanding the class of individuals eligible to use the
plan, by eliminating the previous requirement of unsecured creditor approval of the
debtor's plan . I..." Id. at 313-14.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(5) (1988).
26. In enacting § 1322(bX2), Congress intended to protect residential mortgage lenders
because of the valuable service that they provide. See Patricia Lindauer, Optimizing the
"Fresh Start". Mortgage Crarmdown Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 J.L. &
CoM. 257, 267 (1992). The special protection provided by § 1322(bX2) to the residential
mortgage lending industry "'preserves the integrity of the mortgage contract .... In re
Sauber, 115 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990). The concern appears to have been that
without special protection, mortgage lenders would be hesitant to lend or would be more
likely to take steps to protect themselves against the possibility of a cramdown, which
would increase the costs to consumers. See, e.g., Federal Land Bank v. Glenn (In re Glenn),
760 F.2d 1428, 1433-34 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, by Miller v. First Fed., 106 S. Ct. 144
(1985). Stated differently, the special protection afforded the mortgage industry can
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of the rights of creditors with claims secured only by the debtor's
principal residence .2  A problem arises, however, when the
amount of the claim for the mortgage lien exceeds the market
value of the residence securing it, or in other words, when the lien
becomes undersecured.2 8 Debtors argue that the general provi-
sions of § 506(a) allow bifurcation of a secured creditor's under-
secured claim even if the claim is secured by the debtor's principal
residence.2 9 Section 506(a) permits the separation of an allowed
claim into secured and unsecured portions for payment determi-
nation under a reorganization plan.30 The attempts by Chapter 13
debtors to employ the provisions of § 506(a) in order to reduce an
undersecured claim to the present value of the secured collateral
has been referred to as a "cramdown.
' 31
Bifurcation of undersecured mortgages into secured and
unsecured portions under § 506(a) has been allowed by four circuit
courts.32 Bankruptcy courts in five other circuits have adopted the
perhaps be best explained by the argument that "the availability of attractive and
affordable home mortgages will vanish if lenders are required to forfeit too much under a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy." Lindauer, supra at 281.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(bX2) (1988).
28. See generally John Mixon & Ira B. Shepard, Antideficiency Relieffor Foreclosed
Homeowners: ULSIA Section 511(b), 27 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 455,471 n.80 (1992) (stating
that the term "undersecured" generally means that the lien and the debt exceed the
current market value of the property). Some courts have noted that home loans are rarely
undersecured. See, e.g., Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d
1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1989). In areas of the country where property values have declined,
this may not be the case. See Susan Dentzer, Staying Afloat, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Nov. 12, 1990, at 62. A decline in housing prices will no doubt be experienced in those
areas of the nation to be affected by the airbase closings.
29. The general provisions of § 506(a) are applicable to Chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13
bankruptcies by virtue of § 103(a). 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988).
30. For the text of § 506(a), see supra note 5 & 6. See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair
Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1989) (holding that "subsection (a) of § 506 provides that a
claim is secured only to the extent of the value of the property on which the lien is fixed; the
remainder of that claim is considered unsecured .... ).
31. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 486 n.5. Some courts use the term "cramdown"
interchangeably with the term "lien stripping." In re Davidoff, 136.B.R. 567, 568 n.3
(Bankr. M.D. Fl. 1992). A subtle distinction between the terms "cramdown" and "lien
stripping" should be noted. A "cramdown" is a situation in which one creditor's secured
claim is only partially supported because the value of the collateral securing it is less than
the secured claim. Interview with John S. Foster, Bankruptcy Practitioner and Adjunct
Professor at the University of North Dakota School of Law, in Grand Forks, ND (Jan. 28,
1993). The creditor is left with a bifurcated claim under § 506(a), which is then "crammed
down" to the lesser value of the collateral. Id. Although "lien stripping" is a related
concept, it is not quite the same. "Lien stripping" involves creditors whose liens are
inferior to creditors with prior liens and are subsequently "stripped away" when their liens
cannot attach to any equity because the superior lien has consumed the value of the
collateral. Id.
32. See Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182, 1183-84
(9th Cir. 1989) (finding that § 506(a) applies to a Chapter 13 case and permits a debtor
under a Chapter 13 plan to modify the unsecured portion of a claim secured by his
principal residence); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir.
1990) (stating that § 1322(bX2) does not preclude the modification of an unsecured portion
of an undersecured mortgage lien claim); Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart); 923
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opposite position by finding that bifurcation of an undersecured
residential mortgage violates the rights of certain secured claim
holders under § 1322(bX2), and is therefore impermissible.33 The
lack of continuity between the courts on this bifurcation issue has
caused confusion in the legal profession and concern among mort-
gage lenders.34
In January of 1992, the United States Supreme Court decision
of Dewsnup v. Timm 35 added to the lack of clarity in Chapter 13
mortgage cramdowns.36  The Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtor in
Dewsnup sought to utilize the provisions of § 506 in order to bifur-
cate the lien on nonresidence real property into secured and
unsecured claims.37  The debtor then sought to avoid the
unsecured portion of the claim under § 506(d) and redeem the
property at the reduced value. 38 Reasoning that the term
F.2d 1410, 1415 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that bifurcation of a home mortgage into secured
and unsecured portions was not an impermissible modification of the mortgage lien claim);
Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176, 179-80 (2d
Cir. 1992) (opining that the bifurcation of a mortgage lien claim does not modify the
creditor's rights under § 1322(bX2)). At least one commentator has suggested that those
courts which permit mortgage cramdown are "misinterpreting a statute so as to unfairly
favor the debtor." See Lindauer, supra note 26, at 259.
33. See In re Mitchell, 125 B.R. 5, 8 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) (stating that the Bankruptcy
Code does not allow bifurcation of a residential mortgage claim into secured and unsecured
portions); In re Etchin, 128 B.R. 662, 665 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1991) (holding that § 1322(bX2)
provides protection to creditors whose claims are secured by a debtor's principal residence
and concluding that bifurcation would run afoul of that protection); In re Russell, 93 B.R.
703, 707 (D.N.D. 1988) (opining that the debtor's plan proposing payment of only the fair
market value of collateral modified a claim secured by debtor's principal residence in
violation of § 1322(bX2)); In re Schum, 112 B.R. 159, 162 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991) (holding
that § 1322(bX2) prohibits the modification of the secured status of a creditor whose claim is
secured only by the principal residence of the debtor); In re Chavez, 117 B.R. 733, 737
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (stating that bifurcation would be an impermissible modification of a
creditor's mortgage rights in violation of § 1322(bX2)).
34. See Lindauer, supra note 26, at 266.
Because mortgage cramdowns are a new phenomena, lenders have not had
a chance to safeguard against them and could take heavy losses. If cramdowns
become accepted practice, lenders warn that consumers can no longer
anticipate favorable terms and lower interest rates presently available. If
bankruptcy proceedings are permitted to frustrate mutually agreed-upon
provisions, the home mortgage industry will be negatively affected and home
mortgages will become less attractive to investors. Financial institutions will, in
turn, limit their mortgage business in some areas.
By making mortgage cramdown an available option for Chapter 13 debtors,
[some] circuits have exposed the mortgage industry to potential serious impacts.
Id. at 278-79 (footnotes omitted).
35. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
36. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992). See also In re Barnes, 146 B.R. 854
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1992) (discussing the uncertainty regarding the application of Dewsnup
to Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases).
37. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 776. Bankruptcy petitioner sought to have respondent's
real estate lien for approximately $120,000 (secured by two parcels of Utah farmland)
judicially reduced to the much lower fair market value of the farmland. Id. By operation of
§ 506(a), respondent's claim for the existing lien would then be secured only to the extent of
the value of the farmland. Id.
38. Id.
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"allowed secured claim" did not have the same meaning in§ 506(d) as in § 506(a) and was therefore ambiguous,39 the Court
held that the debtor could not use the provisions of § 506(d) to
"strip down" the respondent's lien claim.4 ° It was the Court's
view that the term "allowed secured claim" as used in § 506(a)
should be read term-by-term to mean a claim which is "allowed"
within the meaning of § 502, and then "secured."'4 1 Therefore,
§ 506(d) could operate to void only those secured claims which are
not determined as being allowed.42
In analyzing the term "allowed secured claim" in the text of§ 506, the Supreme Court recognized that historically liens on real
property have survived bankruptcy unaffected. 43 The Court fur-
ther recognized that it was unaware of any pre-Code provision,
other than in reorganization proceedings, which permitted an
involuntary reduction of the amount of a creditor's lien for any
reason other than payment on the debt.44 Turning to legislative
history for guidance in deciphering the textual ambiguity between§§ 506(a) and 1322(bX2), the Court noted an absence of any con-
gressional intent to provide debtors with a "broad new remedy
against allowed claims to the extent that they become 'unsecured'
for purposes of § 506(a)," since such a remedy was not explicitly set
forth in the Bankruptcy Code or the congressional record.45 Since
neither Congress nor the Code provided for the "strip down," the
Court labeled the approach "not plausible" and "contrary to basic
bankruptcy principles. "46
The Dewsnup Court proposed that its reasoning with regard
39. Id. at 778.
40. Id. Since § 506(d) voids only liens that have not been allowed or secured, the
debtor could not utilize the provision to strip the lien and thereby lower her debt
obligation. Id. The "strip down" provisions of § 506(d) with which the Court was
concerned, state that "[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is
not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void ...." 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988).
In his dissent, Justice Scalia heartily disagreed with the majority of the Court and
rigorously argued for a uniform interpretation of similar terms throughout the Bankruptcy
Code. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 779-88 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was particularly
troubled by the fact that while the majority opinion resolved the issue before the Court, its
ruling would lead to problems in interpreting similar terms in other provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 788. Six months later, Scalia's criticism of the majority opinion in
Dewsnup could still be found interwoven within his concurrence in Patterson v. Shumate,
112 S. Ct. 2242, 2250-51 (1992).
41. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 777-78. The Court adopted the position of the respondents
that an "allowed secured claim" was not an "indivisible term of art defined by § 506(a),"
because reading the words term-by-term, the claim must first be allowed and then secured.
Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 778.
44. Id. at 779.
45. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 779.
46. Id.
1993] 247
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to the ambiguity of the term "allowed secured claim" between
subsections 506(a) and (d) be confined within the Chapter 7 con-
text in which it was decided.47 However, policy considerations of
whether a bankruptcy debtor should be allowed to "strip down" or
"cramdown" a secured claim have made the Dewsnup opinion vir-
tually impossible for a court to ignore when confronted with the
issue of whether or not to allow a bifurcation of an undersecured
mortgage lien claim in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.48
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered the applica-
bility of Dewsnup to the Chapter 13 bifurcation issue in Bellamy v.
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy).49 The Chap-
ter 13 debtors in Bellamy sought to have the mortgage lien on
their home bifurcated into secured and unsecured claims, pursu-
ant to § 506(a).50 By this bifurcation process, the debtors hoped to
have the mortgage lien deemed a secured claim only to the extent
of its present market value, with any excess of the lien amount
over the market value declared unsecured and therefore dis-
chargeable under § 506(d). 1
The Second Circuit found irrelevant the Supreme Court's
decision in Dewsnup to the matter before it, and determined that
"secured claim," as found in § 1322(bX2), meant the same as
"secured claim" in § 506(a).5 2 Once the court determined that
"secured claim," had the same meaning in both subsections, it con-
cluded that the protection of § 1322(bX2) was limited to the
secured claim as found first by application of § 506(a). 3 There-
fore, the court held that bifurcation of the mortgage lien claim did
47. Id. at 778. The Dewsnup majority stated that "[h]ypothetical applications that
come to mind... illustrate the difficulty of interpreting the statute in a single opinion that
would apply to all possible fact situations. We therefore focus upon the case before us and
allow other facts to await their legal resolution on another day." Id.
48. See, e.g., Sapos v. Provident Inst. of Say., 967 F.2d 918, 920-21 (3d Cir. 1992)
(stating that a court must decide the applicability of Dewsnup before proceeding to
confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan).
49. 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992).
50. Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176, 178
(2d Cir. 1992). Debtors Jimmie and Cynthia Bellamy purchased their Connecticut home on
May 24, 1987. Id. The home was financed by a $133,000 promissory note, secured by a first
mortgage to Comfed Mortgage Co., Inc. (Comfed). Id. Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corp. (Federal) later purchased the mortgage from Comfed. Id. Debtors filed for
reorganization under Chapter 13 on April 18, 1990. Id. A proof of claim was filed by
Federal for $151,340.85. Id.
51. Id. The parties stipulated the market value of the property to be $127,500. Id.
Federal argued that such bifurcation was a modification of its rights and prohibited by
§ 1322(bX2). Id. at 178-79.
52. Id. at 182. The Bellamy court found the Supreme Court's analysis of § 506(d) in
Dewsnup as "inapposite" to the interpretation of § 1322(bX2). Id. at 183. The court further
found that in light of § 506(a) established bankruptcy principles were not violated by the
application of § 1322(bX2). Id. at 184.
53. Id. at 183-84.
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not constitute a modification of creditor rights prohibited by
§ 1322(bX2), since the secured portion of the mortgage lien claim
as found under § 506(a) would not be modified.5 4
Acknowledging that § 1322(bX2) prohibited modification of
the rights of a residential mortgage lender, the court extended
§ 1322(bX2) protection to such a lender, but only to the extent of
any secured claims as defined by § 506(a) that the lender may
hold. 5' The court stated that "[w]hether-and the extent to
which-the mortgagee holds a secured claim must first be deter-
mined according to § 506(a)."'56  It was the court's opinion that
allowing Chapter 13 debtors to adjust a residential mortgage in
this manner would better enable them to retain their home.5 7
Thus, the Second Circuit reasoned that applying § 1322(bX2) to
cramdown an undersecured residential mortgage in light of
§ 506(a) furthered the congressional intent of providing reorgani-
zation of debts for individuals with regular income in Chapter 13
bankruptcy.58
III. ANALYSIS
In August 1992, Nobleman v. American Savings Bank (In re
Nobleman)5 9 presented the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals with an
opportunity to address the confusion caused by the interplay
between § 506(a) and § 1322(bX2) of the Bankruptcy Code.6 ° The
court recognized the lack of continuity within the judiciary with
regard to the issue of whether or not a debtor could bifurcate an
undersecured residential mortgage claim.6 1 Then, to gain a foot-
54. Id. at 179.
55. Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 179.
56. Id. (citing Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410, 1413 (10th
Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 127 (3d
Cir. 1990); Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182, 1183 (9th
Cir. 1989)).
57. Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 184.
58. Id.
59. 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992).
60. Nobleman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d at 489. The court
noted that the different positions of the parties and their amici demonstrated a lack of
clarity "regarding the interplay between § 506 and § 1322(bX2) of the Bankruptcy Code."
Id. at 486.
61. Id. The court discussed the position adopted by the Second, Third, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits that "bifurcation of an undersecured mortgage into a secured portion and an
unsecured portion" is permissible. Id. See supra note 32. The opinion also discussed the
position advocated by bankruptcy courts in the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits that bifurcation of a residential mortgage claim under Chapter 13 is
impermissible because such bifurcation would diminish the purpose of § 1322(bX2) to
provide protection of the rights of home mortgage lenders. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 486-87.
See supra note 33. The Fifth Circuit opinion cited to the case ofln re Bradshaw, 56 B.R. 742
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985), as an example of a Sixth Circuit bankruptcy court supporting the
proposition that bifurcation is impermissible because it would diminish the purpose of
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hold on what ultimately became its stand on bifurcation of an
undersecured mortgage claim, the Fifth Circuit turned its focus to
the reasoning of the nation's highest court in Dewsnup v. Timm.6"
While acknowledging that the United States Supreme Court
had attempted to specifically confine its opinion to the context of
the Chapter 7 proceedings of Dewsnup,63 the Fifth Circuit never-
theless utilized the policy arguments advanced by the Dewsnup
majority against lien stripping under § 506(d), thereby foreshad-
owing its refusal to allow the use of § 506(a) to bifurcate an under-
secured mortgage claim into secured and unsecured portions.64
The Circuit Court opinion is almost a mirror image of the Dew-
snup opinion in format and content.65
The Nobleman court found the "plain meaning" of
§ 1322(bX2) as unsupportive of § 506(a) bifurcation. 6 The court
opined that § 1322(bX2) concerns the modification of the rights of
holders of claims, not the modification of the claims. Therefore,
the court determined that even if the total value of a secured
claim is not supported by the value of the collateral securing it, as
long as the collateral securing that claim is real property that is the
debtor's principal residence, the rights of such a secured
claimholder are protected from modification by § 1322(bX2).68
The court completed its analysis with a discussion of the legis-
lative history of § 1322(bX2). 69 The court had previously reviewed
§ 1322(bX2). Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 486-87 n.7. It should be noted that the 1989 case of In
re Frost confined the decision in Bradshaw to treatment of fully secured mortgage claims.
In re Frost, 96 B.R. 804, 807 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989). The Frost court held that secured
claims protected by § 1322(bX2) are determined only after application of § 506(a). Id.
62. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 487. Because the Supreme Court would not allow a
Chapter 7 debtor to "strip down" a creditor's lien on real property to the lesser value of the
collateral, the Fifth Circuit noted that the recent Dewsnup decision by analogy lent support
to the view that Chapter 13 bifurcation should not be allowed. Id.
63. Id. at 486 n.6.
64. Id. at 487. By use of a quote from the Dewsnup opinion, the Nobleman court
agreed that if the Bankruptcy Code or Congress had intended to give debtors the remedy
they sought, it would have been expressly mentioned within the statute. Id. The court
recognized that a creditor's lien remains with the property until foreclosure because that
was the original bargain between the parties. Id.
65. Id. at 484-89. Both the Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit court began with a
discussion of facts, set out the parties arguments in a separately numbered section of their
opinion, recognized the lack of clarity in understanding the interplay between § 506(a) and
§ 1322(bX2), and concluded with discussion of legislative history and statutory construction
to define each court's position.
66. Id. at 487-88. The court recognized that "[t]he plain meaning of legislation should
be conclusive" and that the words of the statutes should speak for themselves. Id. at 487
(quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)).
67. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 488.
68. Id. Quoting from the statute, the court found that § 1322(bX2) "can properly be
read as excepting from its reach modification of 'the rights of holders of... a claim secured
only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence ....'" Id.
69. Id. at 488-89.
1993] CASE COMMENT 251
the historical account of § 1322(bX2) in Grubbs v. Houston First
American Savings Association,7 0 wherein it recognized a congres-
sional desire to "afford some protection to the home mortgage
industry."''7 The court returned to that account in order to but-
tress its position in Nobleman.72 Based on its view that the specific
provisions of § 1322(bX2) prevailed over the general provisions of
§ 506(a), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals chose to break ranks
with other circuit courts and found § 506(a) bifurcation of an
undersecured home mortgage in a Chapter 13 Plan of Reorganiza-
tion prohibited by the provisions of § 1322(bX2).73
Two months later, the legal community had an opportunity to
see how the Nobleman ruling would be utilized by the judiciary.
On October 26, 1992, an Oklahoma bankruptcy court in In re
Barnes7 4 opted for the reasoning and conclusion contained in
Nobleman, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit had previously allowed Chapter 13 bifurcation in
Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart).75 Prior to the circuit
70. Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984). The debtors
in Grubbs sought to de-accelerate and cure a prepetition default on a mortgage note which
otherwise would have matured during the term of their reorganization plan. Id. at 238.
The Fifth Circuit held that the debtors could de-accelerate the residential mortgage and
could propose to pay the prepetition arrearages through the plan. Id. at 237. In reaching
the determination applicable to Grubbs, the court utilized an extensive analysis of the
legislative history and policy rationales protecting the mortgage lending industry behind
§ 1322(bX2). Id. at 242-46.
71. Nobleman v. American Say. Bank, 968 F.2d 483, 489 (5th Cir. 1992).
72. Id. at 488-89.
73. Id. at 489.
74. In re Barnes, 146 B.R. 854 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1992). The residence owned by
Chapter 13 debtors Larry Michael and Janice K. Barnes was secured by a lien only in favor
of Knutson Mortgage Corporation. Id. The parties stipulated that the value of the
residence was approximately one-half of the amount due on the debtors note for purposes
of the bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at 854-55. The debtors' plan of reorganization proposed
treating the mortgage company's claim as secured up to the stipulated value of the
residence, with the remainder treated as unsecured. Id. The plan provided for no
payments to unsecured claimholders. Id.
75. Id. at 855. The court in Barnes was faced with a strange situation. While the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Easland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d
1410 (10th Cir. 1991), allowing Chapter 13 bifurcation, was precedential and controlling
within the circuit, confusion had arisen among the judges of the District of Oklahoma
Bankruptcy Court as to the relevance of the Supreme Court's ruling in Dewsnup to
Chapter 13 bankruptcies. Id. at 854. The Barnes court noted that at least two out of three
Oklahoma Bankruptcy Court decisions since Dewsnup had found that bifurcation of a
residential mortgage claim was not permitted in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Id. at 855. The
court noted that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had not addressed the cramdown
problem since the Supreme Court's ruling in Dewsnup. Id. It should be observed that
Dewsnup was appealed to the United States Supreme Court from the Tenth Circuit. In re
Dewsnup, 908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1990). An Oklahoma bankruptcy court had previously
turned to the Tenth Circuit decision in Dewsnup for support in its determination that
Chapter 13 bifurcation was impermissible. See In re Moran, 121 B.R. 879, 883 (Bankr. E.D.
Okla. 1990). The court's previous recognition of the significance of Dewsnup in Chapter 13
debtors' attempts to use § 506(a) to bifurcate mortgage lien claims may hold the key to the
court's current confusion among the fora regarding the importance of Dewsnup to Chapter
13 cases. In re Barnes, 146 B.R. 854 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1992).
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court's decision in In re Hart, allowing bifurcation of a home mort-
gage lien claim, the Oklahoma bankruptcy court had prohibited
Chapter 13 bifurcation as an impermissible modification of a credi-
tor's claim secured solely by a debtor's principal residence.76 Fol-
lowing the decision in In re Hart, the court continued to uphold its
view that Chapter 13 bifurcation was impermissible. In In re
Barnes, 8 the court found persuasive the Fifth Circuit's view that
the specific language of § 1322(bX2) prevailed over the general
language of § 506(a).7 9
About one month after Barnes, however, the Georgia case of
In re Mann8 ° disagreed with the Fifth Circuit, and the Georgia
Bankruptcy Court granted confirmation of a Chapter 13 reorgani-
zation plan which proposed to bifurcate an undersecured residen-
tial mortgage into secured and unsecured portions."' The
Eleventh Circuit bankruptcy court compared the post-Dewsnup
rulings of Bellamy 2 and Nobleman,8 3 and found persuasive the
arguments advanced by the debtors in Bellamy for bifurcation of
residential mortgages under Chapter 13 bankruptcies.8 4 The
bankruptcy court determined that contrary to the belief of the
Fifth Circuit, the Dewsnup decision had no impact on § 1322(bX2),
because Dewsnup was limited solely to the Chapter 7 context in
which it was decided.8 5 Therefore, the debtors were allowed to
use § 506(a) to bifurcate their residential mortgage into secured
and unsecured portions despite the provisions of § 1322(bX2).8 6
IV. CONCLUSION
In In re Barnes, Chief Judge Richard L. Bohanon stated that
the issue of Chapter 13 bifurcation of residential mortgages is one
76. See In re Moran, 121 B.R. 879, 883 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1990).
77. See In re Doss, 143 B.R. 952, 954 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1992). The court stated that it
"respectfully but strongly disagree[d] with the Tenth Circuit's ruling as being in direct
contravention to the express provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code under
§ 1322(bX2)." Id. at 953.
78. 146 B.R. 854 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1992).
79. In re Barnes, 146 B.R. 854, 855 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1992).
80. In re Mann, Bankr. No. 92-10021-ALB, 1992 WL 355430 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1992).
81. Id. at *5.
82. 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992).
83. 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992).
84. In re Mann, Bankr. No. 92-10021-ALB, 1992 WL 355430 at *4. In agreement with
the findings of Bellamy, the court in Mann determined that a claim must first be secured as
determined by § 506(a). Id. The court stated that determination of a claim's secured status
under § 506(a) prior to application of § 1322(bX2) provided harmony between Bankruptcy
Code provisions and avoided conflict. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at *5.
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that "begs to be settled." 7 Fortunately, a ray of hope for those
struggling in the darkness that constitutes the interplay between
§ 506(a) and § 1322(bX2) glimmers in the near future. The
Supreme Court of the United States has granted certiorari in
Nobleman v. American Savings Bank to decide the bifurcation
issue that has plagued judges and practitioners alike.88 Will the
nation's highest court follow its prior holding of Dewsnup in nar-
rowing the abilities of Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitioners to
cramdown mortgage claims as it did Chapter 7 lien stripping? Or,
will the Court find, as have the majority of circuit courts, that the
protection of § 1322(bX2) is limited to claims that are first found as
secured under § 506(a)?
One could argue that § 1322(bX2) is not a magic wand that is
going to give a bank or mortgage lending institution, in the con-
text of a bankruptcy proceeding, the full value of a mortgage lien
if the home that secures the lien is no longer worth the amount
remaining on the debt.8 9 To treat an undersecured residential
mortgage claim as fully secured under § 1322(bX2) encourages the
abandonment of the home, making the property just another addi-
tion to the "graveyard" of the financial institution's inventory of
real estate.90
By virtue of § 506(a), the holder of an undersecured claim in
bankruptcy is treated as the holder of two claims, one secured and
the other unsecured.9 Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code provides
that a bankruptcy court may confirm a plan of reorganization
which proposes to bifurcate or modify an undersecured claim into
secured and unsecured portions in either a Chapter 11, 12 or 13
bankruptcy proceeding. 2 The fly in this statutory ointment is
87. In re Barnes, 146 B.R. at 855.
88. Counsel have been notified that they are on the March docket for oral argument
before the United States Supreme Court. Telephone Interview with Michael J. Schroeder
of Miller, Davis & Opper, Counsel for Appellee, American Savings Bank (Jan. 29, 1993).
89. Telephone Interview with Philip Palmer, Jr. of Palmer & Palmer, Counsel for
Appellants, Leonard and Harriet Nobleman (Jan. 22, 1993). It would seem, however,
equally arguable from a policy perspective that Congress may have deliberately chosen not
to further aid debtors in retaining their homes, as such relief may be too great an incentive
for entering into bankruptcy. Lindauer, supra note 26, at 281 n.144.
90. Telephone Interview with Philip Palmer, Jr. of Palmer & Palmer, Counsel for
Appellants, Leonard and Harriet Nobleman (Jan. 22, 1993).
91. For the text of § 506(a), see supra note 5 & 6.
92. A bankruptcy court may confirm a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization if, among
other things, the plan provides "with respect to a class of secured claims":
(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such claims,
whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or
transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such claims;
and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such
claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim,
2531993]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
§ 1322(bX2). Unlike § 111 1(b), which by its express terms provides
an alternative for treatment of undersecured claims in a Chapter
11 case, there is nothing in the language of § 1322(bX2) to warrant
deviation from the statutory norm of allowing bifurcation of
undersecured claims.93
Debtors, such as the Noblemans, also argue that by seeking
bifurcation of an undersecured home mortgage lien, they are in
effect only trying to replicate the foreclosure procedure in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding.94 However, in the normal foreclosure scena-
rio, the creditor is afforded the opportunity to purchase the
residence at the judicial sale and retain it until real estate prices
have risen to a level which would allow the creditor to recover
most, if not all, of the debt owed against the property. Whether
the creditor opts to retain the real estate for later sale in hopes that
the market price for real estate will rise, or opts to resell the prop-
erty as soon as possible at a judicial sale, the benefit to a creditor of
an immediate and greater realization of its claim outweighs the
debtor's argument for reduction and continuation of the mortgage
contract. Moreover, the possibility also remains that the debtors
of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's
interest in the estate's interest in such property ....
11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(bX2XAXiXI) & (II) (1988). With regard to secured claims, a bankruptcy
court may confirm a plan of reorganization in a Chapter 12 bankruptcy if:
[W]ith respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan-
(BXi) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien secur-
ing such claim; and
(ii) the value as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distrib-
uted by the trustee or the debtor under the plan on account of such claim is not
less than the allowed amount of such claim.
11 U.S.C. §§ 1225(aX5XBXi) & (ii) (1988). With regard to secured claims, a bankruptcy court
may confirm a plan of reorganization in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy if:
[W]ith respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan-
(BXi) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien secur-
ing such claim; and
(ii) the value as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distrib-
uted by the trustee or the debtor under the plan on account of such claim is not
less than the allowed amount of such claim.
11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(aX5XBXi) & (ii) (1988).
93. For the text of § 1322(bX2), see supra note 9. Such a strict constructionist view
would be in keeping with the Supreme Court's rejection of its term-by-term interpretation
of the Bankruptcy Code in Dewsnup and adoption of a consistent usage interpretation
found in Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2251 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting
that the court's analysis proceeds on the assumption that phrases in one part of the
Bankruptcy Code are highly relevant to phrases in another since "consistency of usage
within the same statute is to be presumed.").
94. Brief for Petitioners, at 6, Nobleman v. American Say. Bank, - S. Ct. -. (1993) (No.
92-641). The argument is based on the assumption that if the debtors abandon the
residence, the creditor would seek to lift the automatic stay imposed by the bankruptcy
proceedings and proceed to foreclosure. Id. Upon foreclosure and sale of the residence,
the creditor would probably only receive the fair market value of the home, leaving the
balance of its claim as an unsecured deficiency. Id. Any such deficiency may subsequently
be subject to discharge.
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may again default on their home mortgage lien once the lien has
been reduced by the bifurcation process.95 By utilizing the provi-
sions of § 506(a) to bifurcate an undersecured claim, the debtors
are arguably placing themselves in a position to receive an unfair
"windfall" since they will be required to pay off the value of the
residential mortgage only up to the lesser market value of the
property and will enjoy the benefits of any subsequent apprecia-
tion in value, should real estate prices recover in the future.
96
The Supreme Court's decision in Nobleman is expected to
have great impact on consumer groups and the home mortgage
industry.97 Regardless of what the Court's ultimate decision is, the
question of whether Chapter 13 debtors can bifurcate a mortgage
95. See Lindauer, supra note 26, at 278.
The lender is forced to resume collecting payments from the debtor at the
original payment schedule, thus assuming the risk that the debtor may default-
a risk previously (and typically) assumed by the lender, but under the original
loan agreement at the original bargained-for loan amount. The lender will not
get the amount it bargained for, but must assume the same risks. Additionally,
the mortgagee has lost its bargained-for right to foreclose and write off the
original amount of the debt.
Id. (footnote omitted).
96. Id. At least one commentator has suggested that:
By giving the debtor a break on his [or her] mortgage amount by permitting
the bifurcation of the mortgage, bankruptcy judges are constructing a new
provision in the Code.
The courts are giving the debtor a "break" by reducing the entire amount
the debtor owes his [or her] bank.
Moreover, the value of the home could realistically increase in a healthier
market. Property in an area can depreciate rapidly during an economic
downturn or when the area's leading or only industry leaves town. If a
depressed housing market improves, mortgagees have no recourse. The bank,
while it was forced to assume the risk of the property depreciation, will not
benefit from property appreciation. The debtor could, realistically, get a
windfall if property values increase and the debtor sells. That possibility bestows
on the debtor much more than the Code-contemplated "fresh start." The result
is even more disturbing when one considers that the home may have
depreciated in value not because of a depressed market but because of the
debtor's abuse or neglect of the property.
Id.
97. At least three home mortgage lending trade associations have indicated a desire to
file amici briefs in support of American Savings Bank's position in this case. Telephone
Interview with Michael J. Schroeder, of Miller, Davis & Opper, Counsel for Appellee,
American Savings Bank (Jan. 29, 1993). Although the exact number has not yet been
determined, various consumer groups are also expected to file briefs in support of the
debtors. Id.
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lien claim on their principal residence into secured and unsecured
claims should finally be answered.9"
Leanne K. Gardner
98. Congress has also recognized the need to clarify the issue of whether or not
residential mortgage bifurcation is permissible under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.
On June 17, 1992, the Senate passed Senate Bill (S.) 1985. Section 310 of Title III (entitled
"CONTENTS OF PLAN") which provided for the amendment of § 1322(bX2), provides as
follows:
Section 1322(bX2) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by striking
"'claims;" and inserting "claims, but the plan may not modify a claim pursuant to
section 506 of a person holding a primary or a junior security interest in real
property or a manufactured home (as defined in section 603(6) of the National
Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C.
5402(6)) that is the debtor's principal residence, except that the plan may modify
the claim of a person holding such a junior security interest that was
undersecured at the time the interest attached to the extent that the interest
remains undersecured . . ."
138 CONG. REC. S8357, S8368 (daily ed. June 17, 1992). Section 202 of Title II of House Bill
(H.R.) 6020 (entitled "PRESERVATION OF HOME MORTGAGE LIENS") proposes to
amend § 1322(bX2) as follows:
Section 1322(b)(2) of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) by striking" other than a claim secured only by a security interest in
real property that is the debtor's principal residence, ", and
(2) by inserting before the semicolon at the end of the following: "except
that the rights of the holder of a claim secured only by the most senior security
interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence may not be modi-
fied to reduce the secured claim to a value that is less than the value, as of the
date the security interest arose, of the creditor's interest in the estate's interest in
such property".
138 CONG. REC. H11052-54 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1992). On October 7, 1992, the Senate
adopted the amendments to § 1322(bX2) as proposed by the House. 138 CONG. REC.
S17500-02 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1992). Both bills are still pending before the legislature. Major
Bills Pending, 102d Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. [415], [417].
